

27 AUG 2008

(f) Evaluating response times.

(g) Determining apprehension probabilities.

(h) Service times.

d. Dissemination. The timeliness and format of crime analysis is vital to the usefulness of information generated. To that end, such analysis shall:

(1) Be tailored to meet the particular requirements of patrol investigative and administrative personnel.

(2) Arrive in a timely manner that allows a reasonable time for MPs/police officers and criminal investigators to develop and implement countermeasures and response strategies for the problem at hand.

(3) Present in a manner that distinguishes conclusions from theories and indicates the degree of reliability of analysis conclusions.

(4) Make recommendations for combating identified problems.

e. Feedback and Evaluation. Feedback from PMO/MCPD divisions/branches in response to crime analysis and studies is essential to evaluate and improve the utility of this function and the effectiveness of various agency strategies, programs and tactics.

(1) Crime analysis shall be accompanied by a request for feedback to track and evaluate the effectiveness of enforcement actions and countermeasures. Feedback will use Marine Corps after action format and include issue/topic, discussion and recommendation.

(2) Operations Division and CID/ Investigations Branch will address the crime or other problem areas identified and utilize data provided to develop and implement enforcement tactics, strategies and long-range plans.

(3) After appropriate action is completed, the feedback will be returned to the Crime Prevention Section or CID/Investigations Branch for impact analysis.

27 AUG 2008

2. Coordination with Other Criminal Justice Agencies

a. The Crime Prevention Section and CID/Investigations Branch shall coordinate its operations with criminal justice organizations/agencies whenever appropriate and necessary to fulfill its mission or to support the common mission of the law enforcement community. This may include, but is not limited to, linkages with other installation military police organizations, the installation SJA, U.S. Attorney, prosecuting attorneys, local, state and regional intelligence systems, and other local and state law enforcement and criminal justice agencies.

b. The Crime Prevention Section and CID/Investigations Branch are responsible for safeguarding the confidentiality and security of documents under their control.

(1) Requests for information from outside agencies shall be forwarded to designated PMO/MCPD personnel for approval. Release of information shall comply with federal law, Marine Corps Orders and DOD instructions/manuals/regulations at all times.

(2) Requests for information from MPs/police officers, criminal investigators or other personnel working in PMO/MCPD shall be made by memorandum or letter to the CID/Investigations Branch Officer, Chief Investigator, Supervisory Investigator, or Physical Security Chief.

Section 13300 - Case Management

13301. Purpose. This section establishes PMO/MCPD procedures for criminal investigation case management.

13302. Policy. Effective case management is important in ensuring that investigations are conducted properly and reported in a timely manner. PMOs/MCPDs shall utilize the seriousness of the offense and consideration of other factors, including trends or gang activity, to determine whether a case will be assigned for continued investigative effort.

13303. Procedures

1. PMs/CPs shall:

a. Ensure that all major criminal offenses and other incidents set are referred to NCIS as delineated reference (aq).

b. Ensure the appropriate investigation of all criminal offenses aboard the installation. Major offenses not assumed by NCIS shall be investigated by CID/Investigations Branch. Ensure all that when MPs/police officers/criminal investigators ask for a person's name and personal identifying information such as social security number, address, phone number, etc., they shall provide the individual a privacy act statement (see figure 2-1) or when completing an IR, if a person is asked personal identifying information, the MP/police officer/criminal investigator must read the person the privacy act statement at the top of the IR.

2. When MPs/police officers determine there is a need to refer investigative responsibility, they will notify the duty criminal investigator of the reported incident. Whether the incident is referred or the duty investigator receives a complaint directly, he/she shall:

a. Conduct a preliminary investigation to determine investigative jurisdiction. When asking for a person's name and personal identifying information such as social security number, address, phone number, etc., they shall provide the individual a privacy act statement (see figure 2-1) or when completing an IR, if a person is asked personal identifying information, read the person the privacy act statement at the top of the IR.

b. Assume investigative jurisdiction per this section, refer the matter to NCIS per the MOU Between CMC and the

27 AUG 2008

Director, NCIS, local agreements, or to other appropriate authorities, or decline jurisdiction.

3. When CID/Investigations Branch assumes investigative responsibility, the duty criminal investigator shall document all pertinent information and prepare a ROI (Open). When it is determined that investigative responsibility rests with NCIS, the duty investigator shall document the referral on a ROI (Referral). The duty investigator shall provide a copy of the Open or Referral to the Dispatch/Communications Center for entry in the Desk Journal. All investigations assumed by CID/Investigations Branch shall be documented and reported on an ROI.

4. Once NCIS assumes investigative responsibility for an incident, MPs/police officers and criminal investigators may continue to provide assistance, as approved by the PM/PC.

5. CID/Investigations Branch Case Screening, Assignment and Review

a. The CID Officer, Chief Investigator or Supervisory Investigator shall assign cases to the person having the knowledge and skills necessary for the investigation. Assistance may be received from others; however, accountability remains with the assigned criminal investigator. The following offenses, including reported major or felony offenses, shall either be referred per Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Between Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) and the Director, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) or investigated by CID/Investigation Branch:

(1) Homicide, suicide, suspicious death, or felonies involving firearms.

(2) All sex offenses.

(3) Robbery.

(4) Arson or suspicious fires.

(5) Burglary, residential or commercial, when a suspect is in custody, if someone was home during the burglary, or the value of property taken/damaged is \$1000.00 or more. For burglaries with the value of property taken/damaged is less than \$1000.00, the duty criminal investigator, CID/Investigations

27 AUG 2008

Branch Officer, Chief Investigator or Supervisory Investigator may make a decision based on their discretion.

(6) Violent crime, when injuries to victim(s) occur.

(7) Child abuse or neglect.

(8) Offense involving gang activity.

(9) Offenses identified as being part of a trend based on crime analysis.

(10) As directed by the PM/PC.

b. The CID/Investigations Branch Officer, Chief Investigator or Supervisory Investigator shall monitor all assigned cases to ensure they are thoroughly investigated and supplemented, as required by policy.

c. Each criminal investigator shall maintain an "active" case file in which cases are filed by case control number, which will be accessible to supervisors at all times.

(1) The case file shall contain all investigative reports, notes, pictures, etc.

(2) This file shall not contain evidence, cleared, or inactive cases.

(3) Original reports shall not be kept by an investigator.

(4) Case files shall be accessible to MPs/police officers on a need to know basis.

(5) Case files shall be maintained per references (bw) and (b).

d. Once a case has been assigned to a criminal investigator for investigation, it will remain open until one of the following occurs:

(1) The case is cleared.

(2) 30 days elapse. A ROI (CLOSED) will be submitted at a minimum of 30 days after initiation of an investigation. In the event case activity cannot be completed within 30 days, an

27 AUG 2008

ROI (PENDING) will be submitted and resubmitted every 30 days thereafter, until the investigation is closed. All cases remaining active at the end of 30 days will be reviewed by the assigned criminal investigator and the Chief Investigator or Supervisory Investigator to ensure that all viable leads are being followed or they have been thoroughly exhausted prior to closing. Command notification will be made at a minimum of every 30 days and reflected as a separate paragraph in the case summary of the ROI.

(3) There are no more viable leads available or no further progress can be made on an assigned case. The criminal investigator shall note in the report that the complainant and/or command, as appropriate, was notified and the case was being classified as closed.

(4) A ROI (CLOSED) must be submitted within five working days after completion of the last substantive lead in the investigation.

27 AUG 2008

Section 13400 - Protective Security Details

13401. Purpose. This section establishes procedures for PMO/MCPD protective security details (PSDs).

13402. Policy

1. Criminal investigators and MP investigators (MPI) are directed to conduct full-time protective security missions to personnel designated as Level 1 high risk by CMC per references (ad) and (ae), or as requested by the commander exercising geographical responsibility for the area being visited.

2. The mission of PSD is to protect the principal from assassination, kidnapping, injury, and embarrassment. Protective security (PS) personnel must be able to react instantly to an attack by protecting and evacuating the principal.

3. The two types of security while working protective services are personal security and physical security. Personal security is the protection of the principal, while physical security is the property related to the protective mission.

4. Personnel required for a PS operation are: the Agent in Charge (AIC), Protective Security Officer (PSO), the Advance Team, the Protective Team, the Residence Watch Team, and the Baggage Team.

a. The SAC is responsible for all aspects of the mission and is commonly referred to as the Detail Leader.

b. The PSO is responsible for the close-in protection of the principal and remains with the principal at all times when the principal is away from the residence.

c. The Protective Team is the closest team to the principal. These members may change frequently, but they will provide protection for the principal, allowing only authorized personnel to approach the principal.

d. The Advance Team's main mission is to precede the principal and conduct site surveys. The Advance Team establishes the residence watch, but does not man the command post.

27 AUG 2008

e. The Residence Watch Team is in place at the residence and places abroad. The residence watch is set up when a visit is 24 hours or longer. They will establish a visitor control system and keep a daily journal.

f. The Baggage Team will maintain total accountability for baggage and equipment and will supervise baggage handling at all times.

5. The four essential fundamentals of protective services are: planning; assignment of responsibilities, availability of resources, and control of information.

6. Three Protective Cordons

a. The inner cordon is the protective detail and the closest to the principal.

b. The middle cordon can be the plain-clothes personnel in a counter-surveillance mode.

c. The outer cordon can be the uniformed police used as a deterrent.

7. Five Levels of Alertness

a. White. Relaxed and probably asleep.

b. Yellow. A relaxed awareness state.

c. Orange. Completely alert.

d. Red. Suspect danger (probably in a chokepoint)

e. Black. Countermeasures are in motion.

13403. Procedures

1. Installation PMs/CPs are responsible for:

a. Supporting PS operations and/or providing protective security operations for individuals designated by the DOD and CMC (PS) when directed. This includes the planning and execution of close-in protection for the principal, and coordinating every phase of the mission, to include the middle and outer cordons of security.

27 AUG 2008

b. Provide technical advice and assistance to commanders on protective security operations. This includes the conduct of personal security vulnerability assessments, as requested by commanders.

c. Screening of MPs/police officers for augmentation in support of protective security operations.

d. Providing administrative, logistical, and personnel support, as required for protective security operations, and directing the outer cordons of security in support of the protective security mission.

e. Coordinating with installation commanders in the designation of Level 2 high risk personnel.

f. Ensuring training and equipment necessary for PS operations are provided and maintained on the installation.

2. Protocol

a. Protective security members should always dress to provide a professional appearance. The dress attire should be conservative with an attempt to blend in as much as possible. Suits for men and women should be dark in color. Shirts should fit properly and be a light color, not too flashy. Shoes should be comfortable; the best soles are rubber, which decrease sound and improve traction. Women should stay away from wearing dresses/skirts while working PS because it does not look professional and could cause embarrassment during evacuations. Earrings should not be flashy; specifically avoid wearing hoop style earrings. The important thing to remember when dressing for a PSD is: comfort, fit, and style of the clothing. See section 5300 for guidance on PSD pins.

b. During advance work PSDs deal with many people. Make appointments according to the POC's schedule. PS personnel should be punctual, early if possible, but not earlier than 30 minutes. If PS personnel are going to be late, call to let the POC know. Always wear a suit (coat and tie) when meeting with someone to discuss the mission. This shows professionalism and is a direct reflection of the principal. When meeting the POC, establish rapport and do not be demanding. PS personnel must know what they want, so as not to be wasting the POC's time. PS personnel shall always leave their phone number with the POC in case of changes, but contact/call the POC prior to the mission execution to ensure everything is as planned.

27 AUG 2008

c. As a member of the protective detail, make introductions from the highest ranking to the lowest. Meaning - if the principal is the lowest ranking, they will go over to the higher ranking and be introduced. Therefore, it is important to know who the senior person is at any function.

d. During official functions, ceremonial reviews, and receiving lines the PSO should not walk with the principal, but should remain close enough to respond during an incident. When dismounting from the vehicle, the principal should not open his/her own door. Keep the car protected until it is clear for the principal to dismount.

e. While dining, the principal should not be placed with their back towards an open area or high traffic area.

f. PS personnel do not sit with the principal during dinner or any other formal occasion unless directed or asked by the principal. PS personnel should sit close enough to maintain security, but not so close as to invade the privacy of the principal.

g. The senior person in the vehicle almost always rides in the left rear seat. This is usually the principal, but if a senior officer or dignitary also rides in the vehicle, this seat is the proper "power" seat. If there are specific threats, PS personnel should consider re-arranging normal seating patterns to make targeting the principal more difficult. This is especially true when transiting on a route with choke points or in a high risk area.

h. When traveling with the principal, PS personnel should only answer questions that are directed at them. Give succinct answers and make sure everything that is heard in the car stays in the car. Do not listen to private conversations. Be prepared to use a cellular telephone, when needed. Keep a checklist of all phone numbers to use if needed.

i. Everyone in the vehicle should wear seatbelts. Do not insist that the principal wear one, but suggest it.

j. The principal's briefcase should always be placed in the back with the principal, unless otherwise stated.

k. If PS personnel are involved in a formal (parade) motorcade, the vehicles will normally be ordered by rank. If the principal is the only one with protection, PS personnel may

be able to dictate the appropriate order of vehicles for security reasons.

1. On occasion, the principal may offer gifts to members of the PSD. Gifts of this nature should be declined if such action would not embarrass the principal. If a detail member feels the declination would embarrass the principal, the gift should be accepted and the PSO and SAC should be notified within a timely manner.

3. Command and Security Post Considerations

a. A command post, commonly referred to as the residence watch, should be set up when a visit is 24 hours or longer. It is set up and selected by the Advance Team, but is manned by the Residence Watch Team. The Residence Watch Team members should be provided by the PMO/MCPD Operations Division. Normally, these individuals are either from the SRT or MPs/police officers. The command post should be set up close to the principal and his/her communications, and be manned around the clock.

b. Three Types of Security Posts

(1) Checkpoints. Maintain access rosters to secure areas and control access to those areas.

(2) Surveillance. Conduct site surveillance/counter-surveillance to identify possible threats to the principal or security personnel.

(3) Special. Any post not specifically covered by checkpoints or surveillance. Examples of special posts would be supernumeraries, uniformed security, and MWD/CPWD patrols.

c. Security pins should be used to point out/separate/identify security members for the mission.

d. There are several types of equipment and supplies that are recommended for the command post:

(1) Closed circuit television.

(2) Communications such as radios and telephones.

(3) Computer equipment or typewriter.

27 AUG 2008

(4) General office supplies.

(5) Journals.

(6) Radio/telephone logs.

(7) Comprehensive maps.

4. Special Weapons and Equipment

a. Investigators will be armed with their issued military weapons as provided by the PM/PC or CMC (PS). In combat zones/high risk areas, the weapons may need to be upgraded, including machine guns for vehicles and aircraft, and other combat weapons systems, as appropriate. The host government, the U.S. Embassy, and the U.S. military representative must approve all weapons.

b. Special equipment that can be used includes: Mag lights, metal detectors, ASP batons, chemical products, cameras, etc. The firearm garment (FAG) bag is also a good product that can be used in a low threat area and in a more "casual attire" environment. Additionally, the shoulder holster provides quick access to the weapon and is comfortable for most people. Ballistic apparel or vests are recommended for the protective team members with a spare ballistic vest accessible for the principal, if needed.

c. Effective communications are vital to protective security operations. Hand-held and portable base station frequency modulated (FM) radios equipped with surveillance packages will be available. All hand-held radios should have hands-free operation capability and all networks should be capable of secured communications. In addition to radios, cellular telephone(s) should be obtained with an adequate number to provide each team leader with an additional form of communication.

5. Personal security vulnerability assessment (PSVA). The NCIS Resident Agency (NCISRA) is responsible for conducting a PSVA and can provide this to the SAC or PSO of the mission. The PSVA consists of five phases: in-brief, research, covert, overt and exit brief.

a. The in-brief phase should be provided to all those concerned with the execution of the mission. The in-brief should provide your actions and your intentions for the mission.

27 AUG 2008

b. In the research phase, PS personnel are looking at past documentation and problems. Evaluate the previous PSVAs along with the physical survey and the installation vulnerability determination, looking for recurring deficiencies.

c. During the covert phase, determine how the principal breaks up their activities. The following questions should be answered. Are they taking different routes to work? What will they do at work? How do they return/travel from work? What do they do off duty? Remember, during the covert phase, your presence should not be known.

d. The overt phase may take longer and be more time consuming. This phase depends on the principal. PS personnel must inspect facilities, interview the personnel staff, check the duress system(s), inspect the residence and the vehicles that are used, and interview family members. Obtaining a photograph of the principal and family members is recommended. Obtain a local area threat assessment (NCISRA can provide).

e. Once PS personnel have compiled all required information, they need to plan an exit brief to provide to the appropriate personnel involved in the execution of the mission.

f. Remember, the most predictable movement is during the A.M. During P.M. hours, the principal is less predictable, due to variations in times to depart the work environment. As a protective team member or PSO, keep the principal from being time and place predictable.

6. Formations

a. The five types of formations used in a PS mission are: diamond, wedge, circle, cave-in and fence line. The protective team member assigned to the right flank is normally the individual responsible for the movement of the formation, but anyone else in the formation may assume this duty.

(1) The diamond consists of the PSO and four security team members. The diamond formation can/should be used in a situation where the principal is moving through a crowd or congested area.

(2) The wedge consists of the PSO and three security team members. The wedge formation can/should be used where a low or negligible threat exists, or less tightly knit formation is deemed appropriate.

27 AUG 2008

(3) The circle consists of the security team members interlocking their arms, facing outward from the principal, thus forming a protective circle around the principal.

(4) The cave-in consists of the security team members covering up the principal with their bodies when an attack is made on the principal.

(5) The fence line is a modified diamond. This formation is used normally when the principal is physically greeting a crowd by shaking hands, etc.

b. The Arms Reach Principle is used for the protective security team members when assessing a situation or reacting to potential danger. The Arms Reach Principle is implemented if the threat is perceived to be within 0 to 7 feet from the principal or detail. The protective team member identifying the threat will "attack the attacker." The Arms Reach Principle has four main parts.

(1) Evaluate the threat. There are four threat categories.

(a) Any handheld projectile firing device is considered a gun; therefore, the command "Gun" is yelled.

(b) Any handheld non-firing projectile device is considered a weapon; therefore, the command "Weapon" is yelled.

(c) Any item airborne coming into your formation is considered an object; therefore, the command "Object" is yelled.

(d) Any explosive device on the ground is considered a grenade; therefore, the command "Grenade" is yelled.

(2) Sound off with the threat and direction. The threat direction is determined by which way the principal is facing at the time the threat is noticed.

(a) Gun front; gun right; gun left; gun rear, etc.

(b) Cover.

(c) Evacuate.

7. Mounted and Dismounted Formations

a. Mounted and dismounted formations are the basic concept of how the investigators provide security in the vehicles and upon departure from the vehicles. The first basic concept to consider is the duration and extent of exposure of the principal. There are four "categories" or types of motorcades; formal, informal three-car, informal two-car, and extended.

(1) A formal motorcade is usually four or more vehicles. This can be either a parade or ceremonial motorcade. If the option of motorcycles is available, during a low threat, they should be positioned near the front fenders of the principal's vehicle and throughout the formation. During a high threat, they should be positioned by the principal's doors.

(2) The basic informal three-car, as the name indicates, contains three vehicles. The cars maintain a specific offset and interval usually determined during the route survey. The first car, or front car is called the "lead" with the principal's vehicle next and the last car, or "chase" vehicle located in the rear.

(3) The informal two-car with extended advance is the most commonly used. The advance car (or lead) can be one/two minutes ahead of the motorcade or any distance that the SAC deems necessary to the mission. This formation has the principal's vehicle in front with the "chase" vehicle following.

(4) The extended motorcade is not recommended for use, but offers an extremely low profile. The vehicles seemingly function separately, but terrorists must take an even closer look to positively identify the principal and the follow/chase vehicle is in a better position to identify any surveillance. PS personnel may be forced to use this motorcade when the principal does not like security.

b. The recommended offset for the motorcade vehicle is $\frac{1}{2}$ car length from each other and $\frac{1}{2}$ car width left or right. The threat level in the area and the speed the motorcade is traveling determines the exact offset.

c. Location/seating of the protective security members within the vehicles of an informal three-car motorcade is as follows:

(1) The "lead" vehicle has the point man of a diamond formation sitting in the front passenger's seat.

27 AUG 2008

(2) The PSO is seated in the principal's vehicle in the front passenger's seat.

(3) The "shift leader," or the member who will assume the right flank position in a diamond formation, is seated in the front passenger's seat of the "chase" vehicle. The "shift leader" is in charge of the shift of personnel. The PSO has responsibility of the mission at hand, but the "shift leader" conducts and handles all business for the PSO.

(4) The member who is assigned to the rear of the diamond formation is seated in the left rear passenger's seat.

(5) The member who is assigned to the left flank of the diamond formation is seated in the right rear passenger's seat.

8. Motorcade Operations

a. When motorcades turn at intersections, it is important for the "chase" car to shield or screen the principal's vehicle. The chase vehicle should not over-compensate, but always be at the ready to shield to the side or the rear. When a motorcade makes a right turn, the chase car shields to the left side of the principal's vehicle.

b. In a normal motorcade movement, the principal's vehicle stays to the right of the lane and the chase car stays to the left of the lane.

c. During lane changes in a three-car motorcade, the "lead man" in the lead vehicle requests a lane change by stating (for example) "One left". In a two-car motorcade, the PSO requests the lane change. The "shift leader" is responsible for granting the request. Once the lane is available, the execution command of "clear" is given. If the lane is not clear, the command "stand-by" is given.

d. During a three-point turn, the PSO would normally request and the shift leader would give the command of execution.

e. The six evasive emergency drills are: Police Interception Technique (PIT), ram, drive through, push out, reverse out, and cover and evacuate.

(1) The use of the PIT is considered deadly force. The "chase" car executes the PIT.

27 AUG 2008

(2) During a ram situation, if the attacking vehicle moves in and blocks the vehicle's path, the point of impact should be to the opposite direction of travel (Remember - ramming is most effective in the rear of a vehicle since it is much lighter than the front). The "lead," or if one is not used, the principal vehicle would normally be the one to execute the ram.

(3) During a drive through "right" situation, the principal car moves to the left and the chase car moves to the right, screening the principal from the threat.

(4) During a push-out situation, or when the principal's vehicle has ceased to operate, the PSO calls the command "Push-out". The "shift leader" gives the commands of "Prepare for a left turn" and the command of "now". The PSO goes over the top of the seat and covers the principal. The "chase" vehicle bumps the principle's vehicle to execute the turn, and then pulls along side the vehicle and the principal is evacuated into the "chase" vehicle.

(5) A reverse out, or "J" turn is initiated by the PSO giving the command of "Reverse out". Upon giving the command, all vehicles will threshold brake; shift into reverse; half - full throttle; count to three; off the gas; violently whip the steering wheel; slam the gearshift into drive; and apply gas.

(6) A cover and evacuate situation is executed when the main and alternate escape routes are blocked. The principal is removed from the vehicle, the team covers the principal and evacuates on foot to the nearest safe haven.

f. During route analysis, the routes to be used should be driven as close to the actual time as possible. Additionally, safe havens, checkpoints, and chokepoints should be annotated during the analysis.

g. Whenever possible, the principal's driver should be an investigator from the protective team who possesses the appropriate driver's training in protective measures.

9. Advances and Site Surveys

a. When preparing for a protective security mission, the following are some general considerations:

(1) Who is the principal (do they want/like security)?

- (2) What is their opinion of security?
- (3) Who will be with the principal?
- (4) Will staff or official party members be traveling with the principal?
- (5) What location is being visited by the principal?
- (6) What is the threat level?
- (7) The duration and extent of the mission may dictate the number of advance days needed to work the mission. The rule of thumb is one day of advance for each day of the mission. However, missions longer than three days will not need to follow this rule.
- (8) Advanced coordination of airlines, rental vehicles, cellular telephones and any other specialty items required by the principal or security staff.
- (9) Obtaining copies of the principal's itinerary.
- (10) Who is the point of contact for each location?
- (11) What is the exact arrival area of the motorcade at each location?
- (12) Where will the cars be parked after the arrival?
- (13) Who will meet the motorcade?
- (14) Who will specifically escort the principal during the visit to the site?
- (15) What is the exact route upon entering the site?
- (16) How many persons will the event site hold?
- (17) Where is the nearest rest room for the principal and party members to use?
- (18) Where is the nearest room for the principal to have a private conversation?
- (19) Where are the nearest fire extinguishers?

27 AUG 2008

(20) Have emergency numbers available, police, fire, hospital, etc.

(21) What are the primary and alternate evacuation routes while at the site?

(22) What are the emergency signals? Has the principal been briefed on these signals?

(23) Where is the nearest hospital?

(24) Where are potential landing sites for medical evacuations?

b. Considerations for Airport Site Surveys

(1) Is there access to the tarmac?

(2) How will the principal be getting on and off the aircraft?

(3) Has customs and immigration been taken care of or needed?

(4) Is there a VIP lounge for the principal to use?

(5) Has press and crowd control been established?

(6) Is secure parking for the aircraft available?

10. Actual Mission Day

a. Arrive at each destination at least one hour prior to the principal's scheduled arrival time.

b. Implement all security measures previously established and have changes confirmed and/or prepared at least one hour prior to the principal's initial arrival at the location or site.

c. Obtain any changes to the itinerary as they come about and brief all concerned parties.

d. "Shift leader" should contact the control room and provide verbal progress and situation reports at established checkpoints and sites.

27 AUG 2008

- e. "Shift leader" should communicate with advance upon approach. Advance should be standing by outside prior to the arrival of the principal (possible introductions).
- f. Advance should lead the principal to designated locations as appropriate.
- g. Advance should brief PSO as soon as possible.
- h. Advance and protective team assume any previously arranged security posts as appropriate.
- i. Stay on site until the "drop dead" time. This is usually half the time it takes for the principal to travel to his/her next location.

Section 13500 - Criminal Investigators in Support of
the Naval Criminal Investigative Service

13501. Purpose. This section establishes guidelines for Marine Corps Criminal Investigators assigned to duty with NCIS, utilization of Marine Special Agents (MSAs), interaction with NCIS for deployments, and support for deployed investigative operations.

13502. Policy. Marine Corps Criminal Investigators will be assigned in support of NCIS per reference (aq) and this section. The MOU Between CMC and the Director, NCIS provides guidelines for the screening, selection, assignment, training and utilization of Marine investigative personnel in support of NCIS activities. Marine Corps Criminal Investigators assigned to NCIS will be referred to as MSAs and issued NCIS credentials and badges.

13503. Procedures

1. Marine Corps personnel assigned to NCIS will be guided in the performance of their daily duties by the investigative policy established for NCIS Special Agents (SA) and as set forth in NCIS internal directives. The conduct of investigations will be in strict compliance with NCIS investigative protocol.

2. Carrying of Firearms, Use of Force, Oleoresin Capsicum and Ammunition

a. SAs are authorized under federal statute to carry a concealed weapon in the performance of their duties. Carrying of firearms, use of force, oleoresin capsicum and ammunition will be in strict compliance with NCIS policy. Upon assignment, NCIS will issue Marine Corps personnel a standard U.S. Government-owned firearm for use in the performance of investigative duties.

b. At least annually, Marine Corps personnel will be provided instruction on the use of force. Such instruction will address the use of force, the force continuum, and provisions regarding the appropriate use of force as set forth in applicable DOD, DON, and NCIS policy directives.

c. Jurisdictional limitations for MSAs. As a matter of law extended to DON reference (ay), reference (i) generally prohibits the use of military personnel to enforce civilian laws. Reference (i) does not, however, prohibit the use of

27 AUG 2008

military personnel to conduct law enforcement activities that are primarily for a military purpose, but which provide a secondary benefit to civilian law enforcement. Thus, for example, it is permissible for NCIS SAs, both Marine and Civilian, to investigate violations of reference (c) by military members, even when the investigation reveals violations of civil laws by persons who are not subject to reference (c). Accordingly, MSAs are empowered with the same scope of enforcement jurisdiction held by civilian SAs, and may be employed in support of NCIS operations, both on and off the installation, when the foundation of the investigation is based upon a legitimate and primary military purpose. MSAs do not have statutory arrest authority and as such may not arrest civilian suspects, but may temporarily detain such persons, pending arrest by personnel with statutory arrest authority.

4. Utilization of MSAs

a. Operational Control. Marine Corps personnel assigned to NCIS as MSAs shall be considered under the operational control of NCIS. As used herein, operational control is defined as the assignment of a MSA under the oversight of a NCIS SAC/SSA, the latter of whom is responsible for the daily investigative activities of the MSA, to include assignment of investigative tasks, evaluation of daily performance, investigative and military related training, firearms re-qualification, physical fitness, quality control of investigative products, formal performance appraisals and professional development.

b. Administrative Control. The Marine Corps retains administrative control over Marine Corps personnel assigned to NCIS for routine administrative and military matters such as pay, transfer, formal disciplinary action, maintenance of Service Record Books/Officer Qualification Records and professional military education.

c. In essence, operational control provides the SAC/SSA with the ability to direct the day-to-day efforts of assigned investigative assets to best meet the needs of the supported command without impacting upon the Marine Corps' overall responsibility for accountability of its personnel.

d. Periodically, Marine Corps commanders may deem it necessary to recall Marine Corps personnel from duty with NCIS in order to support contingencies and/or combat operations. As an integral part of the NCIS investigative team, MSAs play a significant role in the investigation and prosecution of

27 AUG 2008

offenders. Accordingly, diligence must be exercised by Marine leaders to ensure that these MSAs are recalled only when a legitimate requirement exists and is such that a trained investigative asset is essential to the accomplishment of the mission. In the event that a MSA is required by his/her parent command to support military operations, the following recall procedures shall apply:

(1) MSAs will not be recalled for routine scheduled unit events such as command post exercises, field training exercises, unit block training and operations below the Marine Air Ground Task Force/Major Subordinate Command (MAGTF/MSA) level without prior coordination with the SAC/SSA. Unit commanders or their representatives are encouraged to meet at least annually with the SAC/SSA and senior Marine of the local NCIS in order to identify potential support requirements.

(2) Contingency Operations. Upon receipt of a warning order or other notification that indicates the potential for employment of military forces, the MEF PM and MAGTF/MSA Operations Officers will assess the need for criminal investigative support for the operation. If a determination is made that criminal investigative support will be required, the MEF PM or MAGTF/MSA Operations Officer will immediately notify the SAC/SSA of the local NCIS activity of the pending contingency and the need for investigative support. The SAC/SSA will review the requirement and identify personnel to be detailed to support the operation. The SAC/SSA will recommend inclusion of civilian NCIS assets, as appropriate, to provide the deployed Marine criminal investigative unit with necessary technical, forensic and/or infrastructure support that may enhance the accomplishment of the deployed investigative mission. The SAC/SSA, upon notification, will ensure the SAs are available, equipped and prepared for deployment.

(3) Combat Operations. MSAs may be recalled with little or no advance notice for actual combat operations. Coordination should be accomplished with as much notice as possible. If combat operations appear imminent, the SAC/SSA will take action to ensure the MSAs are fully prepared and on standby to execute the deployment as required.

5. Support for Deployed Investigative Operations. The deployment of an integrated investigative team comprised of Marine and civilian SAs and NCIS technical support personnel should be considered in meeting all Marine Corps operational requirements. This approach ensures that SAs maintain the

ability to support the warfighting effort while simultaneously providing the Marine commander with additional investigative capabilities not organic to a PMO/MCPD, such as forensic consultants, criminal laboratory analysis, etc. It is mutually incumbent upon both the Marine command and SAC/SSA to ensure that NCIS SAs and support personnel are properly trained and equipped to support battlefield operations. The following policy shall apply to the deployment of an integrated investigative team:

a. Criminal investigations within the MARFOR area of responsibility (AOR) shall be conducted per NCIS policy.

b. Reporting requirements for criminal investigations will be in compliance with NCIS policy. Completed final ROIs will be provided to the commander and submitted to NCISHQ (Code 23).

c. MSAs will deploy with their NCIS credentials and be assigned to the CID and be responsible to the MEF PM (or MP Bn Commander if appropriate) in the MARFOR AOR. The deployed civilian and Marine SAs will also be under the administrative, and in some cases, the tactical control of the MEF PM (or MP Bn Commander if appropriate). Civilian and Marine SAs will deploy with their assigned weapons. Once retrograde and/or peacekeeping operations begin, the responsibility for conducting, directing and supporting criminal investigations by MSAs and civilian SAs will shift from the MEF PM to the SAC of that geographic area.

d. Pre-Deployment Responsibilities

(1) Training. Both the SAC/SSA and senior Marine SA assigned share equal responsibility for ensuring that all personnel identified for deployed investigative support are fully trained and prepared for deployment.

(2) Equipment. The Marine Corps is responsible for providing the necessary tactical equipment available through normal supply systems to support both deployed Marine and civilian NCIS personnel. NCIS provides the necessary investigative forms, documents and equipment for the proper and professional production of a completed ROI. The Marine Corps is responsible for providing all necessary tactical equipment to support both deployed Marine and civilian NCIS personnel, and specialized clothing or equipment required for the mission.

27 AUG 2008

e. Post Deployment Responsibilities. Following any exercise or training evolution that exceeds 60 days or after any deployment in support of a real world contingency or actual combat operations, both parties are responsible for completing an after-action report for submission to their respective headquarters. Such after action reports will identify lessons learned during the operation and will include specific comments relative to proper utilization of investigative assets, types of investigative missions performed, adequacy of command support; equipment and training deficiencies, and a recapitulation of cases opened, closed and referred during the deployment.

f. NCIS/CID MOU. The relationship between CID and NCIS and the responsibilities of both agencies are outlined in a MOU. This MOU is updated no less than every three years and will provide information on: investigative thresholds, numbers of MSA assigned to NCIS, special support provided by NCIS to the Marine Corps, and any other requirements/responsibilities levied by one agency on another.

Section 13600 - Polygraph Examinations

13601. Purpose. This section establishes procedures for Marine Corps polygraph examinations.

13602. Policy

1. Psycho physiological detection of deception (Polygraph). The polygraph technique was developed in its modern form in the 1920s and has been used by the US Marine Corps since 1948. The polygraph process can best be described as the science of Forensic Psycho physiological Detection of Deception (PDD). Psychophysiology is the subjective interpretation of an applied stimulus (a question) and its related effect on the activity levels of selected physiological functions (respiratory, cardiovascular, electro-dermal) within the examinee. These physiological changes give the examiner insight into the question of whether the individual being tested is truthful or, attempting to be deceptive. What we know about PDD is increasingly being redefined as scientific research in this area continues to evolve. The PDD process itself does not have the propensity for evoking confessions; this ability is based upon the skill of the examiner. While the Marine Corps recognizes the PDD is an invaluable investigative aid, its use should never be considered as a substitute for conventional investigative techniques. Reference (ar) sets forth DOD policy concerning polygraph use, authorizing criteria, reporting procedures and examiner training.

2. The Director, NCIS manages the U.S. Marine Corps Polygraph Program. Per reference (aq), Marine Corps polygraph assets and personnel are assigned under the operational control of the NCIS. Certification and decertification authority of USMC polygraph examiners rests with the Director, NCIS, who receives recommendations regarding the certification decertification of an examiner from the Chief of the Polygraph Division, NCIS. Technical and operational control, quality control, and polygraph request approval authority are also vested in the Chief, Polygraph Division, NCIS.

3. All requests for polygraph examinations shall be submitted by ROI and coordinated by CID with the local NCIS Field Office or Regional Polygraph Site for approval by NCIS. The request can be transmitted via email or facsimile device.

13603. Procedures

1. Requirements for Initial Polygraph Training

a. Marine Corps polygraph examiners are from the enlisted grades of Sergeant through Master Gunnery Sergeant. These Marines receive specialized training at the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute (DODPI), where the curriculum includes courses in psychology, physiology, instrument mechanics, question formulation, chart interpretation, and advanced interrogation techniques. Upon graduation from the DODPI and after successful completion of a probationary period, these Marines receive their polygraph certification. The following are the required qualifications to become an examiner and may be subject to a waiver in special circumstances:

- (1) Be a U.S. citizen.
- (2) Be at least twenty-five (25) years of age.
- (3) Hold an earned baccalaureate degree from a regionally accredited college or university.
- (4) Have at least two (2) years of investigative experience.
- (5) Successful completion of a background investigation and eligible for TS/SCI clearance.
- (6) Successful completion of a polygraph examination.
- (7) Must be an enlisted Marine with 5821 primary MOS.

b. Responsibilities

(1) A polygraph examiner is responsible for conducting the full range of polygraph examinations in support of criminal and counterintelligence investigations, operations, and in some instances, Counterintelligence Scope Polygraph (CSP) examinations. Primary duties include providing polygraph service in an expeditious and objective manner with timely follow-up reporting.

(2) Polygraph examiners make recommendations on: the appropriateness of offering a suspect, victim, or witness a polygraph examination, the medical/psychological suitability of potential examinees, and other administrative matters related to

a polygraph. Although examiners can make recommendations, they should not make determinations on who should or should not be offered a polygraph examination.

(3) Under normal circumstances, polygraph examiners are restricted from participating in interrogations or active participation in on-going investigations. Such restrictions preclude examiners from developing any pre-examination bias regarding the examinee(s). Conversely, as caseload permits, the examiner may assist in protective security operations, administrative matters, surveillance, training, and lectures. Except in critical situations, no polygraph examiner may be assigned duties outside the polygraph specialty without concurrence of the Senior Marine Examiner or, Head, Investigations Section, CMC (PS).

2. Requirements for Polygraph Authorization

a. Criminal Investigations. In a criminal investigation, no polygraph examination shall be authorized unless the following criteria are met:

(1) The investigation has been as thorough as circumstances permit, the suspect has been interrogated and consistent with the circumstances of the case, additional information through a polygraph examination is extremely beneficial for the investigation.

(2) The alleged crime is an offense punishable under the United States Code or reference (c) by death or confinement of one year or more.

(3) There is a reasonable cause to believe that the person to be examined has knowledge of, or was involved in, the matter under investigation.

b. Exculpatory Examinations

(1) Exculpatory polygraph requests will be authorized providing the alleged offense meets the minimum punishment criteria. An exculpatory polygraph examination is a request for a polygraph examination by an individual, whether or not he/she is represented by counsel. In the case of specific phase polygraph requests, the case agent will forward the written exculpatory polygraph request, with command endorsement, to NCIS as an exhibit to the Action/Lead Sheet (ALS) polygraph request.

(2) If an individual requests an exculpatory polygraph examination after terminating or refusing to consent to interrogation, he/she must first agree to submit to a mild interrogation in an effort to ascertain what he/she is denying; if the matter is amenable to resolution by polygraph (intent cannot be determined by polygraph); and if the individual is a suitable examinee (good physical and mental condition) before polygraph authority can be granted. If he/she denied the allegation during the investigation of the case, no re-interrogation is needed prior to the administering of the polygraph examination.

(3) Exculpatory polygraph requests emanating from military defense counsel or appellate defense counsel must be in writing and contain the endorsement of one of the following authorities: court-martial convening authority, SJA, senior trial counsel, or appellate government counsel. Even though an endorsing authority may provide a negative endorsement, the request must be forwarded and considered the same as any other request for polygraph examination. The results of the examination will be provided to the defense counsel, the appropriate endorsing authority, and/or command.

(4) Post-trial exculpatory requests will be given due consideration providing the following criteria are met:

(a) The Marine Corps is provided with a copy of the investigative report and/or a copy of the trial transcript.

(b) The individual seeking the polygraph either denied the offense during interrogation or during courtroom testimony. If not, the individual must agree to submit to a mild interrogation in an effort to ascertain what is being denied to determine if the matter is amenable to resolution by polygraph and to provide the examiner with sufficient information to properly formulate questions.

c. Victims and Witnesses

(1) Polygraphs of victims and witnesses will be authorized when there is sufficient information to question their veracity, not because of lesser rank or grade. All victims and witnesses must have been interviewed with an appropriate legal warning (i.e., false complaint/false official statement/false swearing regarding the alleged offense) prior to the initiation of the polygraph request.

27 AUG 2008

(2) During an investigation involving a victim - suspect confrontation, the suspect will normally be administered a polygraph examination prior to the victim. If the investigation shows there is substantial reason to question the victim's veracity, a polygraph examination of the victim can be conducted prior to examination of the suspect. This practice should only be considered only under special circumstances when the preponderance of the evidence does not support the victim's statement(s). Polygraph examination of rape victims is highly discouraged and will only be considered on a limited basis.

(3) Polygraph examination of witnesses will be authorized only when there is reason to question their veracity. As such, authority will not be granted on the grounds that prosecution desires to bolster the testimony of a witness.

(4) Reference (ar) directs the Marine Corps to sustain a cadre of polygraph examiners for overseas combat related counterintelligence examinations. The law enforcement community maintains the only trained and certified polygraph examiners within the Marine Corps. As such, any intelligence related examinations will be coordinated with the counterintelligence community and NCIS.

3. Polygraph Request Procedures

a. Pending Investigations

(1) Authority to offer a suspect a polygraph examination is vested within each CID Officer/Chief Investigator concerned. CID must ensure the criteria set forth in this section are met. CIDs will have the responsibility of ensuring that the investigation has been as thorough as circumstances permit; that the examinee is mentally and physically competent to undergo a polygraph examination; that the request cannot be categorized as screening or "witch hunting"; that the individual has not terminated the interrogation or requested a lawyer with no subsequent contact having been made; and that the request is not to establish the intent of the suspect. Investigation Branches shall coordinate with the local NCIS office before offering a suspect to take a polygraph examination.

(2) Once a polygraph examination has been authorized, a criminal investigator, during interrogation/re-interrogation, shall offer the suspect the opportunity to undergo a polygraph examination. The criminal investigator should not attempt to explain polygraph procedures, the nature of the questions, or

27 AUG 2008

admissibility in court. The polygraph technique should be explained by the examiner.

(3) Once the individual agrees to undergo a polygraph examination, an ALS requesting authority to administer the examination is submitted to NCIS. Telephonic requests and approvals are authorized in emergency situations, but they must be subsequently documented and followed by an ALS. Expeditious requests may be forwarded via facsimile or electronic mail.

(4) Form of request - The identity (Subject, Co-Subject, suspect, etc.) of persons to be examined shall be contained in the ALS. A detailed ALS containing the identity of the persons to be tested and a substantial synopsis of the investigation, to include all relevant statements or results of interviews, should be submitted unless the submitting component has previously provided an ROI with necessary exhibits to NCIS. If an ROI has been provided, only a brief ALS is required.

(5) When an investigation develops a limited number of suspects, the prime suspect should be administered the polygraph examination first. If there is no prime suspect, examinations will be administered in a logical sequence based on the case information available, provided the examinations do not become "screening" examinations.

(6) No polygraph examination will be administered immediately following a strong or lengthy confrontation with the suspect. A polygraph examination immediately following suspect confrontation may adversely affect the validity of the results. Reference (ar) clearly states that a person being considered for polygraph examination shall be given timely notification of the date, time, and place of the examination.

b. Closed investigations - When a polygraph examination is deemed appropriate, the investigation should be re-opened via an ALS (ROPEN), which will set forth full details of the request to administer the examination.

c. Non-USMC investigations - All requests for polygraph examinations in connection with Non-USMC investigations emanating from Naval Commands, DOD components, or other law enforcement agencies will be opened under the appropriate case category as a specific phase or a reciprocal investigation. All polygraph requests resulting from non-USMC investigations must include the complete investigative report of the investigating agency.

d. General

(1) It shall be the responsibility of the case investigator, or another investigator equally familiar with the investigation, to make certain the examinee is present for a scheduled examination. As such, the case investigator (or representative) should be present and available to the examiner for consultation prior to and during the examination.

(2) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Memo of 21 October 92 stipulates only polygraph examinations conducted by federal agencies shall be used in official DOD proceedings. Accordingly, when a non-USMC or non-federal polygraph examiner has administered a polygraph examination, the USMC will administer a separate examination before making any statement regarding the examinee's veracity. This section precludes examiners from having to review a non-federally trained examiner's charts and render an opinion, unless requested to do so by the JAG/SJA or a military judge.

4. Polygraph Reporting Procedures. Upon completion of an examination, the examiner will prepare an Investigative Action (IA) titled "Results of Polygraph Examination" to be incorporated into the case file. The IA will include the relevant questions asked during the polygraph, the examinee's responses and the opinion of the examiner. Originals of any written statement, waivers, and any investigative actions (results of interrogations) will also be provided as exhibits or enclosures. Appropriate photocopies and original polygraph charts will be retained with the polygraph package in the polygraph examination report that will be separately forwarded to NCIS.

5. Declination of Polygraph Examination

a. If an individual has already agreed and subsequently declines to undergo a polygraph examination, an ALS containing the name of the prospective examinee shall be submitted in a timely manner, canceling the authority to administer the polygraph examination. This ALS will only be forwarded to NCIS with a "Z" lead to cancel the polygraph authority. This ALS will reference both the original document that requests the authority and the ALS that granted the authority. This procedure shall also apply in instances where authority is no longer desired because of resolution by other means which preclude the administering of a polygraph examination.

27 AUG 2008

b. Reference (ar) states, in part, "A refusal to consent to a polygraph examination shall not be recorded in the person's personnel file or any investigative file, nor shall a person's supervisor, and in the case of a contractor employee, the person's employer, be informed of the refusal..."; this means no mention of such refusal shall be included in the ROI. An appropriate method of documenting the situation is to report that the examinee declined further interrogation vice the examinee declined to submit to a polygraph examination. However, deceptive polygraph results may be reported in the ROI.

6. Denials of polygraph requests. When a polygraph request is denied, it is usually for one of the following reasons:

a. The crime does not meet the minimum punishment requirement.

b. A suspect has terminated an interrogation in order to obtain counsel, exercised his/her right to silence, or terminated in such a manner to preclude further contact. If an investigator determines a termination was not final in nature, he/she may re-interrogate the suspect and offer the suspect a polygraph examination, providing the other criteria of this section are met. The circumstances of a terminated/suspended interrogation should be documented to facilitate an accurate evaluation of the situation prior to authority being granted for a polygraph examination.

c. A suspect requested a lawyer and no subsequent contact has been made.

d. A polygraph request states command or "third party" requested a polygraph on a CID controlled case.

e. The investigation has not been as thorough as circumstances permit, such as failure to pursue logical leads that might resolve the investigation.

f. The request can be categorized as screening or "witch hunting" - administering examinations to individuals just because they were present or in the area.

g. The investigator is attempting to identify intent, rather than culpability. Use of a polygraph to determine intent is not reliable and should not be pursued.

27 AUG 2008

h. When it is known that the potential examinee recently received or has a serious injury, illness or disability, details must be specified in the requesting ALS. Such conditions include, but are not limited to, recent surgery, heart conditions, extremely high blood pressure, pregnancy, head injuries, and other severe/traumatic injuries.

i. When a person has undergone psychiatric care or evaluation, an explanation or appropriate documentation should be obtained if possible, and must be included as an exhibit to the request. Expert consultants who are familiar with the polygraph technique can be made available when making decisions regarding a potential examinee's suitability for polygraph examination.

j. Whenever a person's actions are of such a magnitude to indicate severe psychiatric problems, he/she should be seen by psychiatric personnel prior to being offered a polygraph examination.

k. Persons diagnosed as psychotic by qualified psychiatric personnel shall not be administered a polygraph examination.

7. Miscellaneous

a. Pending USMC Investigations - Juvenile Suspects

(1) Parental or legal guardian written consent must be obtained prior to offering a polygraph examination to a juvenile. The written consent will be provided to the case investigator and a copy forwarded in the completed polygraph package to NCIS.

(2) If the parents of a juvenile are considered suspects in an investigation as a result of allegations by the juvenile, it may be impractical to obtain parental consent prior to a polygraph examination of the affected juvenile. This matter should be referred to the prosecuting authority and NCIS for guidance.

b. Polygraph examiners may testify at legal and administrative hearings; however, CID will not provide funding for testimony at any administrative hearing or procedure. This does not preclude the requesting command from providing such funding.

27 AUG 2008

c. Examiner case load permitting, polygraph examinations may be conducted for any law enforcement agency requesting reciprocal assistance. The request must be submitted in writing with sufficient details furnished to ensure compliance with DOD authorizing criteria. Any request for polygraph assistance to support a law enforcement agency outside DOD must receive prior approval from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) or his designee, or the Director for Counterintelligence and Security Programs. Prior approval is not required when DOD personnel are examined in connection with a criminal investigation conducted by a non-DOD law enforcement entity or when non-DOD personnel are subject to reference (c).

d. In certain areas of the world, NCIS, Air Force OSI, and Army CID have instituted a cross-servicing polygraph program. Due to the varying authorizing procedures among the three services, policy and guidelines concerning cross-servicing are addressed by separate correspondence.

27 AUG 2008

Section 13700 - Conducting Formal Interviews, Interrogations,
and Taking Statements for Investigators

13701. Purpose. This section establishes guidelines for criminal investigators when conducting formal interviews, interrogations and taking statements.

13702. Policy. Formal interviews, custodial interrogations of suspects and the statements and confessions elicited are vitally important in the preparation of criminal cases. However, to be admissible as evidence, statements and confessions must be given freely and voluntarily and with due consideration for the suspect's right to silence and right to counsel. Section 2200 covers these rights and provides detailed procedures.

13703. Definitions

1. Custody. A custodial situation exists when a criminal investigator tells a suspect that he is under apprehension or detention. A functionally equivalent situation exists when a "reasonable person" in the suspect's position would feel that his/her freedom of action has been restricted to the same degree as a formal apprehension/detention.

2. Interrogation. Interrogation includes direct questioning of a suspect about a crime or suspected crime, as well as any words, statements or actions by criminal investigators that the criminal investigators should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.

3. Interview. An interview is used to obtain information from a suspect, witness, or victim. Interviews can be conducted in a formal police station setting, they can be conducted on the street, or at someone's home. An interview turns into an interrogation once someone is taken into custody or there is suspicion that he/she committed an offense.

4. Formal Interview. A formal interview is used to obtain information from a suspect, witness, or victim in a formal police station setting. A formal interview turns into an interrogation once someone is taken into custody or there is suspicion that he/she committed an offense.

13704. Procedures

1. Formal Interviews. In some situations, criminal investigators will conduct formal interviews at

CID/Investigations Branch or PMO/MCPD instead of on-scene due to the seriousness of the incident, location of the incident, weather, ages, cooperativeness, etc. The same rules for taking statements apply to formal interviews.

2. Interrogations

a. Interrogations should be conducted at CID/Investigations Branch or NCIS.

b. In an interrogation, statements (OPNAV 5580/3 and OPNAV 5580/4) shall be taken in accordance with procedures in section 2200. When asking for a person's name and personal identifying information such as social security number, address, phone number, etc., criminal investigators shall provide the individual a privacy act statement (see figure 2-1) or when completing an IR, if a person is asked personal identifying information, the criminal investigator must read the person the privacy act statement at the top of the IR. The circumstances surrounding the conduct of interrogations and recording of confessions shall be fully documented. This includes but is not necessarily limited to the following:

(1) Location, date, time of day and duration of interrogation.

(2) The identities of criminal investigators, MPs/police officers or others present.

(3) Miranda or Article 31b rights warning given, suspect responses and waivers provided, if any.

(4) The nature and duration of breaks in questioning, such as providing the suspect food, drink, use of the lavatories or other purposes.

(5) Interrogation records shall be maintained per reference (b) SSIC 5580.13a(1) and 13a(2) as appropriate.

d. Criminal investigators are encouraged to use video and audio taping capabilities, if available, for recording statements and confessions in an overt or covert manner consistent with law.

e. The lead investigator may decide in which cases audio or video tape recordings may be appropriate and whether covert or overt procedures may be used. Tape recordings shall be

maintained per section 13800 and reference (b) SSIC 5580.13a(1) and 13a(2) as appropriate.

f. Investigative Action (IA). In the event a statement can not be obtained from personnel interviewed who have no "first hand" knowledge of the incident, such interview can be recorded via IA. Although not a sworn statement, IA's contain all pertinent information as do statements and are considered to be a form of official communication between the interviewee and interviewer.

3. Statements

a. Criminal investigators will conduct interviews after arriving on-scene to determine the facts of the situation, incident, or crime. Criminal investigators must follow the guidance contained in section 2200 when dealing with suspects. Criminal investigators should first have the person being interviewed explain what occurred, ask questions, and then give guidance prior to the individual writing the statement. After the statement is written, criminal investigators will review and ask follow up questions to obtain a full understanding and get all pertinent information. Criminal investigators will, at a minimum, provide information about the incident and the offense and give the following guidance to people writing statements (OPNAV 5580/2, OPNAV 5580/3 and OPNAV 5580/4):

(1) Write in chronological order and do not change the words provided.

(2) Include who, what, when, where, why and how.

(3) Documenting statements and confessions. The circumstances surrounding the conduct of interviews, interrogations, taking statements and recording of confessions shall be fully documented based on the seriousness of the offense. This includes but is not necessarily limited to:

(a) Location, date, time of day and duration of interrogation.

(b) The identities of officers or others present.

(c) Article 31b and Miranda rights warning given, suspect responses and waivers provided, if any.

27 AUG 2008

(d) The nature and duration of breaks in questioning - provided the suspect food, drink, use of lavatories or other purposes.

b. Statements shall be maintained per reference (b) SSIC 5580.1a and 5580.1b as appropriate.

c. Investigative Action (IA). In the event a statement can not be obtained from personnel interviewed who have no "first hand" knowledge of the incident, such interview can be recorded via IA. Although not a sworn statement, IA's contain all pertinent information as do statements and are considered to be a form of official communication between the interviewee and interviewer.

27 AUG 2008

Section 13800 - Use of Recording Equipment
in Interviews and Interrogations

13801. Purpose. This section establishes PMO/MCPD guidelines and procedures for the electronic recording of interviews and interrogations.

13802. Policy. Custodial interrogations and confessions for serious offenses should be electronically recorded in order to provide an evidentiary record of statements made by suspects. The recording of interviews is not required, but should be done when possible. Such electronic recordings can help protect both the suspect(s) and the interviewing criminal investigators against assertions of police coercion or interrogation misconduct, and may increase the likelihood of successful prosecution.

13803. Definitions

1. Serious Offenses. Homicide, sexual assault, armed robbery, sexual assault, child abuse, and other Part I crimes as defined in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Uniform Crime Reports (UCRs), as well as other crimes defined by the PMO/MCPD, whether committed by adults or by juveniles who could be charged as adults for such offenses.

2. Place of Detention. PMO/MCPD station, detention cell, jail, or similar holding facility in which suspects may be detained in connection with criminal charges. A police vehicle used to transport arrestees may be deemed a custodial environment, but is not a place of detention as defined in this section. Nevertheless, during transportation of suspects who meet the requirements for electronic recording, transporting criminal investigators shall observe applicable procedures defined in this section.

3. Electronic Recording. An audio or video recording, whether using magnetic tape, digital means, or other recording media.

13804. Procedures

1. General Requirements

a. Criminal investigators should electronically record, when such devices are available, custodial interrogations conducted in a place of detention involving serious offenses (or felonies):

27 AUG 2008

b. Criminal investigators are not required to record non-custodial interviews with suspects, witnesses, or victims during the initial interview phase of an investigation but should do so if possible, in accordance with law and PMO/MCPD policy.

c. Electronic recording of juveniles may be conducted if the situation is such that the juvenile suspect can be charged as an adult, or otherwise with parental consent

d. If electronic recordings cannot be conducted due to equipment failure, lack of suspect cooperation, or for other reasons deemed pertinent to successful interrogation by the case investigator, the interrogation may continue without the recording, but the basis for such occurrences shall be documented. This includes, but is not limited to, spontaneous declarations or other statements not elicited by police questioning.

e. While transporting suspects, criminal investigators need not refrain from questioning a suspect who has indicated a willingness to talk, either at the scene or en route to the place of detention, as long as the suspect has been advised of his/her Article 31/Miranda rights and has acknowledged those rights. During transportation, criminal investigators should not purposefully engage in custodial interrogations involving major crimes, as defined by this section.

2. Recording Protocol

a. Suspects do not have to be informed that they are being recorded, unless required by state law. A posted sign or recording device in plain view will suffice for a reasonable person to believe the interview/interrogation is or may be recorded.

b. The installation military justice officer/trial counsel, office of the prosecutor, the case investigator or other authorized PMO/MCPD official may direct that specific interrogations be recorded even if the offense does not meet the criteria of a serious offense, as defined by PMO/MCPD policy.

c. The primary interrogator shall, where possible, obtain a signed Miranda or Article 31b rights warning waiver from the suspect before beginning interrogation. If the suspect elects not to be recorded or refuses to engage in the interrogation, the suspect's rejection shall be recorded when reasonably possible.

27 AUG 2008

d. Interrogations and confessions shall be recorded in their entirety, starting with the interrogator's entrance into the interview room and concluding upon departure of the interrogator and suspect.

e. When commencing the recording, the primary interrogator shall ensure that voice identification is made of criminal investigators, suspect, and any others present, and that the date, time and location of the interrogation is verbally recorded. When beginning a new recording, the interviewer should announce the date and time that the interrogation is being resumed.

f. An authorized member of the PMO/MCPD shall be assigned to monitor the recording time to ensure the recording does not run out. Each recording should include the following:

(1) Declaration of the time the recording began.

(2) Declaration of the start of the interrogation.

(3) Concurrence by the suspect that the interrogation has begun.

(4) Administration of Article 31/Miranda warnings, even if the recording is a follow up to a prior interview or the suspect has been previously given Article 31/Miranda warnings.

(5) Declaration of the time the interrogation ends.

g. Any lapse in the recording for comfort breaks or other reasons shall be accounted for on the recording. As an alternative, during a short recess, the recording may continue without interruption.

h. Recording attorney-client conversations is prohibited.

i. At the conclusion of the interrogation, the interrogator shall state that the interrogation is concluded and note the date and time of termination. The recording shall continue until all parties have left the interrogation room.

j. Recordings of interviews are considered evidence and shall be handled as such. In addition, the following shall apply:

(1) Unused recording media shall always be used for interrogations.

(2) Both the original and copies of all recording media shall be protected from re-recording.

(3) Only one interrogation shall be recorded on each recording media.

(4) Before submitting the original recording to a secure evidence storage area, a copy of the recording shall be made. Copies shall be maintained in the investigative unit.

(5) The identifying information items supplied on the recording label shall be completed and the recording marked either as an original or a copy.

(6) The reporting criminal investigator's follow-up report shall note if and how the interview was recorded.

(7) A transcript of the voice recording should be made whenever possible and included in the case file.

k. All recordings shall be governed by policy and procedures for the handling and preservation of evidence per section 12000 and 12100 and in accordance with reference (b) SSIC 5580.13a(1) and 13a(2) as appropriate.

1. Recordings shall be retained by the CID/Investigations Branch in secure storage for a period of time as defined by reference (b).

Section 13900 - Hostage Negotiations

13901. Purpose. This section establishes PMO/MCPD guidelines and procedures for hostage negotiations.

13902. Policy

1. The main goal of crisis management planning is preservation of human life and the security of personnel and property. The preservation of human life includes the safety of the hostages, law enforcement personnel, the general public, and the captor(s). The initial precepts should be containment of the barricaded captors/hostages in the smallest area; the stabilization of the situation with the least amount of force; and the strict control of weapons. See sections 3000, 3300, 8000, and 9400 for more information on crisis response and management, and NIMS.

2. Barricaded captors/hostage situations are complex and require a coordinated team response to ensure success. The total response to the situation is beyond the jurisdiction and capabilities of PMO/MCPD and must be under the command and control of the respective commander and under the tactical control of the PM/PC. PMO/MCPD has trained hostage negotiators and prior coordination is mandatory to determine what actions will be completed by CID or the Investigations Branch and what actions will be completed by the command.

13903. Procedures

1. The PM/PC is responsible for ensuring he has trained hostage negotiators in the event of a barricaded captor/hostage situation. The Hostage Negotiations Team responsibilities for barricaded captors/hostage situations will include the following general areas:

- a. Advisor to PM/PC.
- b. Intelligence gathering.
- c. Hostage negotiations.
- d. Investigations.
- e. Liaisons.

2. Negotiations

27 AUG 2008

a. Communications with the hostage taker should be established or assumed by the negotiator as quickly as possible. Keep in mind that the first responder may have already established communications with the hostage taker and a transfer must be established. Negotiation logs are a must in any crisis situation. This provides the negotiator with accurate and immediate information.

b. The required Hostage Negotiation Logs are listed below:

- (1) Hostage takers (1 per person).
- (2) Hostages (1 per person).
- (3) Demands.
- (4) Deadlines.
- (5) Weapons.
- (6) Chronological sequence of events.
- (7) Lies/promises.

c. During the course of a hostage confrontation, and when negotiations have begun, it is conceivable that for whatever reason the captor may kill one of the hostages. In this event, it must be presumed that if the captor killed once, they may kill again. At this point, consideration of going from a containment mode into an assault mode must be actively contemplated in order to preserve as many lives as possible. If a death cannot be confirmed, assumptions cannot drive the next course of action. Example: A recent event occurred in London in which a hostage was killed by a hostage taker. The local police did not assault the hostage taker because their intelligence (a hidden microphone in the room where the hostage taker was holding the hostage) led them to believe the slain hostage was so antagonistic towards the hostage taker that the beneficial bonding between them (the Stockholm Syndrome) could not take place. The police believed, correctly, that the slain hostage has a "Martyr Syndrome" and acted in such a way that the hostage taker was forced to kill him. They also believed, correctly, that the other hostages were acting as expected and were not in danger from the hostage taker. Thus, if you can determine through good intelligence that a hostage was killed because they had the "Martyr Syndrome" an immediate assault may not be the best option. If the hostage taker executes a

hostage, in your view, because a deadline has not been met, then an immediate assault should be considered.

d. Hostage Negotiation Logs shall be maintained per reference (b) SSIC 5580.13a(1) and 13a(2) as appropriate.

3. Intelligence Gathering. The key to unlocking the barricaded captor/hostage situation is communication and the ingredient that tempers communication is information. For negotiations to be successful, accurate information must be obtained. Intelligence gathering starts at the scene and continues throughout the command response, winding down only after the hostages are released and the offenders are taken into custody. Several avenues of intelligence gathering must usually be pursued simultaneously. Information is funneled into the command post, where it is evaluated, summarized and coordinated. Anything pertinent to dealing with the hostage taker or to protecting the hostages is then passed along to the negotiation team.

4. Negotiations Process

a. The success rate of law enforcement personnel in defusing highly stressful and dangerous situations is phenomenal. Most crisis situations occur quickly and require instantaneous response. The reactive nature of most law enforcement operations combined with the skills and experience of security personnel usually lead to a successful resolution. The negotiator must have a plan of action, keep minute records of the situation, deal with the suspect and generally know the position and status of all operational units involved.

b. From the onset, the negotiator's aim must be to establish a rapport with the suspect by coming across as a middleman. Once communication is established the negotiator's creativity will be working overtime to find ways to keep the dialogue alive, to keep the hostages safe, and to motivate the hostage taker to do what the negotiator wants.

5. Face to Face. Any hostage situation may require the negotiator and the hostage taker to meet and talk face to face. Getting physically close to the suspect brings the negotiations down to a personal level and may be the final step in winning his full confidence and effecting surrender. Such close contact; however, increases the risk that the negotiator will be injured, killed or taken hostage. It is PMO/MCPD policy to consider going face to face only in the most exceptional

circumstances and upon approval of the on scene commander. Where this approach is allowed, several ground rules must be kept in mind:

- a. Avoid being face to face with more than one suspect.
- b. Always have an access to an escape route.
- c. Never turn your back on the suspect.

6. Surrender and Detention Apprehension Tactics. The release and detention/apprehension of the hostage taker is usually the high point of a hostage-taking incident. Hostages should be searched and considered suspects until it is confirmed that they were the hostages. During the detention/apprehension, the suspect will be told to leave all weapons inside and exit with his hands up. While taking him into custody the arrest team should be cautious and remember that additional suspects may be hiding inside. The perimeter team will remain in their positions until the suspect is apprehended and the building is searched and secured. Once the suspect is apprehended, he will immediately be removed from the scene. The hostages will be provided medical attention and access to mental health personnel as soon as possible

7. Investigation. Once the hostage situation has been resolved by the command, NCIS may assume investigative jurisdiction. If NCIS assumes, NCIS personnel will assume the crime scene and all investigative aspects.

Chapter 14

Traffic Investigations

Section 14000 - Limited Traffic Accident Investigations

14001. Purpose. This section establishes procedures for conducting limited traffic accident investigations aboard Marine Corps installations.

14002. Policy

1. The PM/PC is responsible for ensuring that investigation of motor vehicle traffic accidents is consistent with reference (af), the procedures set forth herein and section 14100.

2. Traffic accident investigations undertaken by PMO/MCPD do not negate the requirement for commanders to conduct JAGMAN investigations.

14003. Procedures

1. Limited traffic accident investigations will consist of a completed IR with appropriate statements (OPNAV 5580/2, OPNAV 5580/3 and OPNAV 5580/4). When completing an IR, if a person is asked personal identifying information, the MP/police officer must read the person the privacy act statement at the top of the IR. Limited traffic accident investigations shall be conducted on motor vehicle accidents that meet the following thresholds:

a. Non-injury accidents involving U.S. Government (GOV) vehicles or property with property damage less than \$500.00.

b. Non-injury personally owned vehicle (POV) accidents on the installation with POV property damage less than \$1000.00.

c. Non-injury POV/fixed object or GOV/fixed object accidents that will not result in a claim for or against the government with POV/GOV property damage less than \$1000.00/\$500.00 respectively.

2. Reporting of Accidents

a. Drivers/owners of POVs/GOVs are required to report all traffic accidents involving injury, fatality, or property damage in excess of paragraph 14003.1 above to PMO/MCPD immediately. These accidents are addressed in section 14100.

27 AUG 2008

b. Drivers of GOVs shall report any accident to their command.

c. Drivers/owners of POVs are required to submit a written report to PMO/MCPD within 72 hours of an accident in the following cases (must include all three):

(1) The accident occurs on the installation.

(2) The accident involves no personal injury.

(3) The accident involves only minor damage to the POV and the vehicle can be safely and normally driven from the scene.

d. Information in the written report for accidents reported per paragraph 14003.2c above cannot be used in criminal proceedings against the person submitting it.

e. Reports required in paragraphs 14003.1 and 14003.2c above will include the following about the accident:

(1) Location, date, and time.

(2) Identification of all drivers, pedestrians, and passengers involved.

(3) Identification of vehicles involved.

(4) Speed and direction of travel of each vehicle involved as appropriate, including a sketch of the collision and roadway with street names and north arrow.

(5) Property damage involved.

(6) Environmental conditions at the time of the incident (weather, visibility, road surface condition, and other factors).

(7) A narrative description of the events and circumstances concerning the accident.

3. The PM/PC shall ensure that the conduct of motor vehicle traffic accident investigations consistent with reference (af) and the guidelines set forth herein and in section 14100.

27 AUG 2008

4. The Chief Accident Investigator shall review all limited traffic accident investigations, submit completed cases to the Operations Officer for review, and ensure case folders are completed for limited traffic accident investigations.

a. Attached to the left side and beginning from the top:

(1) Cover sheet.

(2) Case activity notes.

(3) Any items obtained through investigation.

b. Attached to the right side of the folder beginning from the top:

(1) Cover letter (when appropriate).

(2) IR, including statements, photos, photo data sheet, and sketches.

c. Maintain all original paperwork on the right side of the folder, and keep it in the accident investigation files. Do not release paperwork from the left side of the folder without a court order or through the installation SJA after a FOIA request.

5. MPs/police officers shall complete a limited traffic accident investigation upon receiving a report of a traffic accident per paragraphs 14003.1, 14003.2b and 14003.2c above.

6. MPs/police officers, traffic accident investigators and others who conduct limited traffic accident investigations shall indicate whether or not seat restraint devices were being used at the time of the accident.

7. Limited traffic accident investigations shall be maintained per reference (b) SSIC 5580.13a(1) and 13a(2) as appropriate.

Section 14100 - Detailed Traffic Accident Investigations

14101. Purpose. This section establishes procedures for conducting detailed traffic accident investigations aboard Marine Corps installations.

14102. Policy

1. The PM/PC is responsible for ensuring that investigation of motor vehicle traffic accidents is consistent with reference (af), the procedures set forth herein and section 14000.

2. Traffic accident investigations undertaken by PMO/MCPD do not negate the requirement for commanders to conduct JAGMAN investigations.

14103. Procedures

1. A detailed traffic accident investigation will be conducted on all motor vehicle accidents that meet one of the following thresholds:

a. All accidents that involve an injury/fatality to any person.

b. All accidents that involve a GOV and a POV.

c. Any vehicle accident where the potential for litigation against the U.S. Government or other significant U.S. Government interest exists.

2. Detailed traffic accident investigations shall be conducted by a trained accident investigator (MPs possessing MOS 5813 or civilian police officer having completed the Traffic Institute Accident Investigators Course). Accident Investigation/Traffic Branch will use OPNAV 5580/1A for detailed traffic accident investigations and the cases will be compiled as indicated in paragraph 14103.3 below. Additionally, the following will be included in all detailed traffic accident investigations:

a. Case activity notes.

b. Statements per the guidance in paragraph 14103.4 below.

c. Field sketch while at the scene of the accident. Field sketches will contain legible measurements that indicate the results of the traffic accident. Additionally, at a minimum,

the sketch will indicate final rest positions; location of debris; the width of individual lanes; the width of the roadway; skid marks or tire evidence; identity of reference points used; accident location; date and time of accident; and the investigators name.

d. Photographs of accidents involving injury, fatality, claims for or against the U.S. Government, and hit and run cases with recordable evidence, and accidents involving U.S. Government owned vehicles.

e. Insurance company and policy number of those involved in the accident.

3. Case Folders

a. Accident Investigations/Traffic Branch will maintain separate folders on limited and detailed traffic accident investigations. Reports of accidents investigated by PMO/MCPD will be placed in the appropriate case folder with the case log number typed on the outside of the folder.

b. Detailed traffic accident case folders will be prepared and maintained as follows:

(1) Attached to the left side of the folder and beginning from the top:

- (a) Cover sheet.
- (b) Case activity notes.
- (c) OPNAV 5580/1A rough copy.
- (d) Field sketch with measurements.
- (e) Summary of traffic accident investigation (Desk Journal).
- (f) Envelope with photo negatives or disk with digital photos.
- (g) Any other rough draft paperwork (for example, CLEOC, DONCJIS, or NCIC printouts, medical reports, etc.).

(2) Attached to the right side of the folder and beginning from the top:

- (a) Cover letter (when appropriate).
- (b) IR (when appropriate).
- (c) Typed OPNAV 5580/1A (when appropriate).
- (d) Diagram of accident scene.
- (e) Photographs of the accident (when appropriate).
- (f) Statements in the order of Veh#1 and passengers, Veh#2 and passengers, witnesses.

(3) Maintain all original paperwork on the right side of the folder and keep it in the accident investigation files. Do not release paperwork from the left side of the folder without a court order or through the installation SJA after a FOIA request.

4. Interview and Statement Procedures

a. Although there is no specific requirement for any person to make a statement, accident investigators will make every effort to obtain a written statement from any subject, passenger, and/or witness who may have information regarding an accident under investigation. See policy section 9700 for information on conducting interviews. These statements should be recorded on appropriate statement forms (OPNAV 5580/2, OPNAV 5580/3 and OPNAV 5580/4) and, at a minimum, contain the following:

- (1) Vehicle description and condition before and after the collision.
- (2) Identity of the drivers, passengers and witnesses.
- (3) Traffic and road conditions, to include weather.
- (4) Pre-collision direction of travel and approximate speed for all vehicles, distance danger noticed, and any evasive action taken on the part of either driver involved.
- (5) Any signs or complaints of injury.
- (6) Any contributing factors believed to be involved.
- (7) Location, date and time.

(8) Narrative description of the events and circumstances concerning the accident.

b. In some cases, an investigator's statement may be necessary to capture facts and or extenuating circumstances surrounding the accident and causal factors.

c. Handwritten statements will be sufficient except for the following types of accidents that require the completion of statement forms (OPNAV 5580/2, OPNAV 5580/3 and OPNAV 5580/4). See section 9700 for information on conducting interviews.

(1) Accidents involving major damage to U.S. Government property.

(2) Accidents involving a serious injury or fatality.

(3) Accidents involving major property damage.

(4) Accidents that are potentially controversial.

(5) Accidents that involve complex reconstruction issues.

d. Investigators will ensure all statements are legible, contain required information, and are explicit in detail.

5. The PM/PC shall ensure that the conduct of motor vehicle traffic accident investigations is consistent with reference (af), the guidelines set forth herein and section 14000.

6. Chief Accident Investigator shall:

a. Review all detailed traffic accident investigations and submit completed cases to the Operations Officer for review.

b. Maintain liaison with off-installation police and traffic related agencies in regard to accidents and statistics.

c. Coordinate with Police/Sheriff Traffic Divisions and Departments of Transportation.

d. Schedule and supervise accident investigators.

e. Monitor performance of accident investigators assigned to special event support.

27 AUG 2008

f. Plan events and special operations that affect parking and traffic flow aboard the base.

g. Monitor MOS training, traffic surveys, parking studies, maintenance of the Intoxilyzer machine, and upkeep and calibration of radar units.

h. Schedule, plan and review traffic surveys and forward recommendations to the installation Facilities Department through the Operations Officer.

i. Ensure appropriate MOS training is conducted for traffic investigators per reference (x).

7. Traffic investigators shall:

a. Conduct traffic surveys and forward recommendations to the installation Facilities Department through the Chief Accident Investigator and Operations Officer.

b. Enforce all traffic laws, regulations and orders per reference (af), local base regulations and state traffic codes, and issue traffic citations.

c. Investigate traffic accidents that occur aboard the installation to determine cause and identify suspects per paragraph 14103.2 above. Complete case folders per paragraph 14103.3 and take statements using the procedures in paragraph 14103.4 above.

d. Inform the Dispatch/Communications Center at the beginning and end of each shift.

e. Assist any MP/police officer investigating a bicycle or other minor accident (limited traffic accident investigation), if requested and reasonably available.

f. Notify the Chief Accident Investigator immediately of any off-installation accidents involving potentially controversial or complex circumstances.

g. When conducting accident investigations, indicate whether or not seat restraint devices were being used at the time of the accident.

Section 14200 - Traffic Management and Analysis

14201. Purpose. This section establishes guidelines for traffic management and analysis aboard Marine Corps installations.

14202. Policy

1. The PM/PC, in coordination with the installation Safety Office and Facilities Department (Traffic Engineering), is responsible for the overall traffic circulation plan and traffic management for the installation. Traffic surveys and analysis are used to support this plan. The PM/PC will exercise overall responsibility for directing, regulating and controlling traffic, and enforcing laws pertaining to traffic control aboard Marine Corps installations.

2. Safe and efficient movement of traffic on an installation requires traffic supervision. A traffic supervision program includes traffic circulation planning, supervision, and control of motor vehicle traffic; publication and enforcement of traffic laws and regulations; and investigation of motor vehicle accidents.

14203. Procedures

1. Traffic Planning/Management

a. Circulation planning should be a major part of all long-range master planning at installations. Highway engineering representatives from adjacent civil communities must be consulted to ensure the installation plan is compatible with the current and future circulation plan of the community. The plan should include the following:

(1) Normal and peak load routing based on traffic control studies.

(2) Effective control of traffic using planned direction, including measures for special events and adverse road or weather conditions.

(3) Point control at congested locations by MPs/police officers or designated traffic directors or wardens, including trained school-crossing guards.

27 AUG 2008

(4) Use of traffic control signs and devices such as cones.

(5) Efficient use of available parking facilities.

(6) Efficient use of mass transportation.

b. The Military Traffic Management Command Transportation Engineering Agency (MTMCTEA) will help installation commanders solve complex highway traffic engineering problems per reference (bj). MTMCTEA traffic engineering services include:

(1) Traffic studies of limited areas and situations.

(2) Complete studies of traffic operations of entire installations. This can include long-range planning for future development of installation roads, public highways, and related facilities.

(3) Assistance in complying with established traffic engineering standards.

2. Traffic Analysis

a. Traffic control studies provide factual data on existing roads, traffic density and flow patterns, and points of congestion. Accurate data will help determine major and minor routes, location of traffic control devices, and conditions requiring engineering or enforcement services.

b. Data derived from traffic accident investigation reports will be analyzed to determine probable causes of accidents. When frequent accidents occur at the same location, the conditions at the location and the types of accidents should be examined.

c. Data will be shared with the installation commander, SJA, Facilities Department, Safety Office, and Transportation Department/Motor Pool. The data will be used to inform and educate drivers and to conduct traffic engineering studies.

3. PMS/CPs shall:

a. Ensure the conduct of coordinated traffic control studies with the installation Facilities Department (Traffic Engineering) and Safety Office to obtain the data.

27 AUG 2008

b. Approve both temporary and permanent changes to the installation traffic management/circulation plan to support special events, road closures and new construction, and the placement of all temporary and permanent traffic control signs and devices aboard the installation. Ensure the conduct of a traffic survey at a minimum every five years.

c. Develop traffic circulation plans, in coordination with the installation Facilities Department (Traffic Engineering) and Safety Office to provide for the safest and most efficient use of primary and secondary roads.

d. Submit requests for traffic engineering services, in coordination with the installation Facilities Department, per reference (bj).

4. Chief Accident Investigator shall:

a. Maintain liaison with off-installation police and traffic related agencies in regard to accidents and statistics.

b. Coordinate with police/sheriff traffic divisions and departments of transportation.

c. Provide advice and participate in planning on events that impact parking and traffic flow aboard the base.

d. Schedule, plan and review traffic surveys and forward recommendations to the installation Facilities Department through the Operations Officer.

5. Traffic investigators shall conduct traffic surveys and forward recommendations to the installation Facilities Department through the Chief Accident Investigator and Operations Officer.